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Abstract 
This research aims at clearing up misunderstandings about the distribu-
tive impacts of carbon taxes, which proved to be a decisive obstacle to their 
further consideration in public debates. It highlights the gap between partial 
equilibrium analyses, which are close to the agents’ perception of the costs of 
taxation, and general equilibrium analyses, which better capture its ultimate 
consequences. It shows that the real impact on households’ income distribu-
tion is not mechanically determined by the initial energy budgets and their 
flexibilities but also depends upon the way tax revenues are recycled, and 
upon the general equilibrium consequences of the reform thus defined. The 
comparison of three tax-recycling schemes, modelled in a general equilibrium 
framework applied to 2004 France, demonstrates the existence of trade-offs 
between aggregate impacts on GDP and employment, the consumption of the 
low-income classes, and a neutralisation of distributive impacts. Two more 
recycling schemes allow to outline a space for a compromise between the eq-
uity and efficiency criteria. 
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Introduction 
Consistently prescribed as an efficient tool to mitigate climate change 
(since at least Pearce, 1991), the idea of a carbon tax periodically shows up on 
public agendas in industrialised countries, to be adopted in some instances 
(Finland, 1990; Sweden, 1991; Italy and Germany, 1999; Switzerland, 2008),2 
but to be rejected more often than not: failures of the French Mission Intermin-
istérielle sur l’Effet de Serre (1990), of the carbon-energy tax of the European 
Union (1992), of the BTU tax of the Clinton Administration (1993), of the 
‘ecotax’ of the Jospin government in France again (1998), of the projects in 
Australia and New Zealand (Baranzini et al., 2000: 396), etc. 
These failed attempts doubtlessly have specific historical reasons of 
their own. Still, they all seem to have faced a similar ‘refusal front’, based on 
two major arguments: that of competitiveness distortion, and that of a negative 
impact on the poorer households (Ekins, 1999). However well-grounded these 
fears, it is surprising to observe that they were systematically used to reject the 
carbon tax, rather than treated as surmountable obstacles that merely required 
careful consideration in its implementation. 
In the wake of the Grenelle de l’Environnement, a nationwide consulta-
tion held over the last quarter of 2007, the carbon tax came back on the French 
political agenda. However, the volatility of oil prices and the ongoing eco-
nomic crisis currently strengthen the threat it seems to pose to the poorer 
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households, which hinders its political acceptability. This article is conse-
quently devoted to the equity argument, with as main objective to avoid that 
the actual stakes of a carbon tax reform be blurred by the misconception that 
the agent paying the tax is necessarily the one bearing its ultimate cost. The 
gap between the direct and the ultimate cost can indeed be substantial, as will 
be proven in the case of France. 
I. Perceived vs. real impacts: reasons for the 
gap 
The immediate impact of a carbon tax on the welfare of households3 is 
obviously linked to the share of their budgets devoted to energy consumption. 
It is thus intuitively regressive (Parry et al., 2005): the richer households ad-
mittedly consume more energy and are bound to pay more carbon tax in abso-
lute terms, but the share of energy is larger in the budget of the lower-income 
households, at least in most OECD countries.4 The welfare of the lower-
income households is thus a priori more impacted by both an income effect 
(lower purchasing power of the disposable income), and the ‘necessity good’ 
quality of the carbon-intensive energy consumptions (stronger utility loss). 
This basic reasoning already appears in early works by Poterba (1991) 
or Pearson and Smith (1991)—who also stress that the ‘partial equilibrium’ 
framework implicit behind it has substantial shortcomings: it assumes that en-
ergy producers or distributors pass the entire tax burden through to the con-
sumers; it considers a fixed level and structure of energy supply and demand, 
thereby precluding adaptive behaviour; at last, it ignores the propagation of 
the carbon tax to other goods and services prices through their intermediate 
energy consumptions, and thus the ultimate effects on the economy and house-
hold income. This chain of effects resorts to fiscal incidence, which deals with 
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 The following analysis is restrained to the distribution of the economic cost of a carbon tax, i.e. 
does not extend to the distribution of the induced environmental benefits. 
4
 Although Bosquet (2000) points to exceptions, and Hassett et al. (2007) show that conclusions 
differ whether current consumption or current income are used as richness indicator. Pearson and 
Smith (1991) analyse 6 European countries to find that Ireland only shows a strong correlation 
between income and energy expenses. Scarcer research on developing countries reveals a loose 
correlation, if not an inverse relationship (Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2007). 
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possible discrepancies between the directly perceived distributive impacts and 
those ultimately resulting from ‘general equilibrium’ effects.  
Partial equilibrium analyses were admittedly extended by allowing for 
consumption trade-offs through the introduction of price-elasticities differenti-
ated by class. It turned out that such adaptive behaviour attenuates the imme-
diate direct impact of a tax, but hardly ever reverses its sign (Cornwell and 
Creedy, 1996; West and Williams, 2004). On the contrary, the use of input-
output tables for evaluating the propagation of the tax effect to all prices tends 
to reinforce the regressive effect (Hamilton and Cameron, 1994; Hassett et al., 
2007; Wier et al., 2005). But such computation, however close to the immedi-
ate perception of consumers and facilitated by quite simple arithmetic or linear 
algebra, ultimately reasons in a fictitious world: it assumes constant nominal 
income, and ignores the use made of the tax revenue, which disappears in 
some unexplainable potlatch. 
Although less intuitive and consequently more contrasted, general equi-
librium analyses are also more realistic in that they forbid any form of potlatch 
and guarantee a sort of ‘mass conservation principle’, through their representa-
tion of a balanced accounting framework. This indeed allows to demonstrate 
the crucial role of the recycling mode in determining the ultimate effect of a 
carbon tax. Historically general equilibrium analyses of the carbon tax were 
focussed on the ‘double dividend’ debate, i.e. the question whether the envi-
ronmental benefit induced by a carbon tax could be combined to gains in eco-
nomic growth and employment. While the abundant literature dedicated to this 
question is still open to further research,5 it has nevertheless reached a rather 
consensual set of conclusions: 
• Recycling carbon tax revenues in a decrease of a pre-existing distortive 
tax produces a ‘weak’ double-dividend, i.e. achieves some environ-
mental target at a lower welfare cost than a tax whose proceeds are 
lump-sum recycled—or than other economic instruments as norms, for 
that matter.6 The more distortive the pre-existing tax, the better. In 
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 Bovenberg (1999) provides a synthesis of the theoretical underpinnings. A survey of empirical 
studies can be found in sections of the second and third Assessment Reports of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1995; IPCC, 2001; IPCC, 2007). 
6
 Norms create rents benefitting the polluting industries beyond what is legitimated by the cost 
of their technological restructuring. Besides, the marginal cost of a norm is at least partially 
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Europe a consensus tends to view decreasing labour taxes (payroll 
taxes) superior to decreasing other taxes, subsidies, public deficit or 
debt reduction, etc. (cf. IPCC, 1995, Chapter 8). 
• Obtaining a ‘strong’ double dividend, that is recycling the carbon tax 
proceeds in such a way that the total economic cost of the reform is 
negative, is far from being automatic. Intuitively, substituting a carbon 
tax to payroll taxes should indeed favour employment, and hence 
growth. But taxing carbon means taxing consumption, and taxing con-
sumption is equivalent to taxing the income that pays for it. A payroll-
tax substituting carbon tax thus ultimately weighs on labour as a source 
of income, same as the levy it is replacing (Bovenberg and De Mooij, 
1994a, 1994b; Goulder, 1995).7 
• The ‘strong’ double dividend potential is less elusive when accounting 
for the fact, as empirical models do, that the carbon tax burden is not 
entirely borne by labour or the national productive capital. Indeed it 
also weighs on non-wage household income (financial and property 
rents, transfer revenues), as well as on the oil and gas rent of exporting 
countries (Goulder, 1995; Ligthart, 1998). In total, the levy on national 
labour is indeed decreased and net gains can occur, all the more so as 
the labour market is rigid (Carraro and Soubeyran, 1996). 
In this perspective, accounting for general equilibrium effects becomes 
crucial to assess the fate of low-income classes: a carbon tax that reduces in-
come inequality can also reduce the latter classes’ welfare if it has a positive 
total cost; conversely, a carbon tax causing a strong double dividend, i.e. in-
ducing negative total costs, can increase income inequality while improving 
the welfare of the low-income class.  
Notwithstanding, general equilibrium literature on the distributive ef-
fects of a carbon tax is much less abundant than that on the aggregate double 
                                                                                                                                        
passed through to intermediate and final consumers, whereas that of a carbon tax can be com-
pensated by a recycling in the decrease of other production taxes. 
7
 Besides, a carbon tax distorts the consumption goods market, thus degrading the utility house-
holds derive from their income. In stylized models like that of Bovenberg and De Mooij (op. 
cit.), where unemployment is voluntary, this discourages labour supply and depresses activity. 
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dividend, and still less extensive than the partial equilibrium one on the same 
subject.8 As a matter of fact the past decade has seen less research on the car-
bon tax because of the prejudice of a political impairment, despite the ac-
knowledged theoretical potential9, and because of the attention gained by the 
tradable emission permit option, in the wake of the Kyoto Protocol.10 The re-
sulting weakness in the state-of-the-art requires the economist to be modest on 
the numerical results, but should not prevent him from delivering insights on 
the robust mechanisms determining the ultimate consequences of alternative 
carbon tax reforms. 
The following two sections thus shed light on how the perceived impact 
of a carbon tax changes with the level of analysis. They envisage the imple-
mentation of a tax up to €200 per tonne of CO2 (hereafter /tCO2)11 in 2004 
France, whose household agent is divided into 20 income classes on the basis 
of an INSEE Budget des Familles survey covering the years 2000-2001.12 The 
welfare index used to measure class impacts is the change in real consumption, 
i.e. the sum of a class’s consumption expenses deflated by its specific Fisher 
price index.13 For the sake of clarity results are reported aggregated into 5 
household classes, of the 5% ‘poorest’, the 30% ‘modest’, the 30% ‘median’, 
the 30% ‘rich’ and the 5% ‘richest’ households. 
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 Let us still quote Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) on Belgium, and Yusuf and Resosudarmo 
(2007) on Indonesia. 
9
 See the recent Harvard Project on International Climate Change Agreement (Aldy and Stavins, 
2008). The body of the report stresses the advantages of coordinated national taxes; but these are 
barred from the summary because their adoption is seen as “politically unlikely”. 
10
 This rests on a wrong interpretation of the Protocol, which indeed creates a permit market 
between States, but leaves to each State the choice of which domestic instruments to implement. 
A State could couple a fiscal reform with programs on buildings and transport, to become a per-
mit seller on international markets without having created a domestic permit market. 
11
 Which ex ante increases the average price of gasoline by 54%, and that of residential energy 
by 38%. Although the fossil fuels of residential use are much less taxed that gasoline the heavy 
share of electricity in residential consumption accounts for the lower strength of the signal. 
12
 Following INSEE “income” is defined as total household income over household number of 
consumption units (CU), with CU measured following a modified OECD scale: 1 CU for the first 
adult, 0.5 CU for any other person above 14 and 0.3 CU per children below 14. 
13
 Consumption is preferred to total income to ease the comparison between partial and total 
equilibrium. In general equilibrium the class-specific propensities to consume have limited 
variations that are correlated enough to guarantee that comparing the classes’ variations of real 
consumption is very similar to comparing their total income variations. 
 9
II. Lessons from partial equilibrium analysis 
II.1. Direct impacts with constant energy con-
sumptions 
Let us first consider the impact of a carbon tax as spontaneously per-
ceived at the time of its implementation, that is notwithstanding changes in the 
energy consumptions and their carbon intensities, in the relative prices net of 
the new tax, in nominal incomes or indeed in the consumption-savings trade-
off. Facing such constraints households can adjust their non-energy consump-
tions only. This provides a first order approximation of the tax effects.14 
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Figure 1 Distributive effects,  
partial equilibrium with constant energy consumptions 
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 The first order monetary measurement of the welfare variation (compensating variation) is the 
cost increase of the initial good and services consumed. This approximation is only valid for 
marginal price variations (Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006). 
 10
Unsurprisingly, from such an angle the carbon tax appears regressive 
whatever its level (Figure 1). Indeed, poorest, modest and median households 
alike consistently lose a share of their real consumption roughly one and a half 
times that lost by the richest households, for the simple reason that their en-
ergy budget share is respectively 38%, 36% and 33% higher—the higher rate 
of motorisation of the median and modest classes explains why their loss is 
closely comparable to that of the poorest class, despite lower budget shares. 
II.2. Impacts after adaptation to the new relative 
prices 
Turning to the ability of households to adapt to the new set of relative 
prices implies facing three difficulties related to estimating energy price elas-
ticities: 
• The questions raised by time series econometrics in energy matters: (i) 
the difference between short- and long-term elasticities, and the irre-
versibility or asymmetry effects of a price increase vs. a price decrease 
(Gately, 1992; Peltzman, 2000); (ii) the erratic nature of energy prices 
since the first oil shock in 1973, that make them ill-suited to provide es-
timates for stable policy-related price-signals; (iii) the questionable use 
of a general consumer price index to deflate current energy prices, con-
sidering the dominant role of a certain set of prices (e.g. that of house 
rental services) in the shaping of mobility demand. 
• The lack of panel data over both a period long enough and sufficiently 
disaggregated households to grasp the long-term heterogeneity of 
households’ behaviour—acknowledging that the ability of households to 
adapt depends on, beyond their income level, parameters as diverse as 
the degree of urban sprawl, the share of rurality, or the equipment in in-
frastructures. 
• The impossibility to reason with constant elasticities over the large 
spectrum of taxes tested in this paper, be it only because of the exis-
tence of basic needs and technical asymptotes to energy efficiency at 
any given temporal horizon. 
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For lack of a better solution, we derived own-price, cross-price and in-
come elasticities that are, for each household class: 
• Based on an Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980) estimated on long-term time series (INSEE, 2007);15 
• Decreasing with the tax level, in order to have consumption tend to-
wards an asymptotic value meant as an incompressible basic need.16 En-
ergy asymptotic values are assumed identical for all classes and set at 
80% of the lowest consumption per capita. 
Taking account of these elasticities and asymptotes produces impact es-
timates that can be interpreted as those of a carbon tax having had sufficient 
time before 2004 to deploy its adaptation effects. These estimates seem very 
close to those obtained without adaptive behaviour (compare Figure 2 to Fig-
ure 1): for all household classes consumption flexibility only slightly allevi-
ates the tax burden, and the regressive effect is hardly changed.17 
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 Elasticities for automotive fuel (-50% on average, standard deviation across classes of 7%) 
and for residential energy (-11% on average, standard deviation of 12% across classes) are com-
parable to values found in the existing literature (Graham and Glaister, 2002). 
16
 The reasons for this modelling choice are discussed in a special issue of The Energy Journal 
dedicated to hybrid modelling (Hourcade et al., 2006 ; Ghersi and Hourcade, 2006). 
17
 Part of this lack of sensitivity is explained by the use of real consumption as indicator. Real 
consumption cannot capture ‘basket composition’ effects that would certainly show if some 
utility function could have been properly calibrated. Indeed, detailed modelling results reveal 
consumption decreases of up to 21% for automotive fuel, 5% for residential energy (for a 
€200/tCO2 tax). 
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Figure 2 Distributive effects,  
partial equilibrium with adaptive energy consumptions 
II.3. Introducing a ‘mass conservation’ principle 
Before turning to the more complex general equilibrium effects, the par-
tial equilibrium analysis can be further refined by the introduction of a simple 
‘mass conservation’ principle, with the aim of correcting the ‘potlatch’ disap-
pearance of carbon tax revenues. Let us assume that this revenue is redistrib-
uted to households as a fixed amount per consumption unit (CU, cf. footnote 
12). This recycling rule, through which a substantial share of carbon tax pay-
ments of the higher classes is redistributed to the poorer, results in a dramati-
cally different distribution impact: whatever the tax level the reform turns out 
progressive (Figure 3). 
That an obviously highly egalitarian recycling rule should lead to a pro-
gressive impact might appear tautological. This step is simply meant as a 
demonstration that, beyond the direct regressive effect of the carbon tax, the 
recycling mode of its fiscal product induces another distributive effect that is 
potentially strongly progressive.  
 13
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Figure 3 Distributive effects, partial equilibrium with adaptive energy 
consumptions and fixed per-CU recycling 
In this context it is commonly recognised a good practice to analyse the 
‘pure’ effect of taxation by simulating lump-sum recycling, i.e. that each agent 
or aggregate thereof gets its carbon tax payments refunded. Lump-sum recy-
cling provides indeed a useful framework in which to compare the efficiency 
of diverse recycling options. But this does not mean that it is the only legiti-
mate assumption to be made when assessing a double dividend potential, as is 
sometimes argued under the pretence that any other recycling option could be 
organised as an independent set of transfers between agents. It indeed remains 
that, if a carbon tax were levied, it would be desirable to explore the best pos-
sible recycling option. That best possible recycling option is as much part of 
the carbon tax reform as the tax itself. 
Introducing a ‘mass conservation principle’ thus forces to jointly ana-
lyse the tax and its recycling, which is proven to loosen the mechanical link 
between the carbon tax and the regressive effect. Then general equilibrium 
modelling is required to grasp the simultaneous adaptation of agents to the 
diverse forms such general reorganisations of the fiscal structure can take. 
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III. Ultimate distributive impacts: general equi-
librium analyses 
The analysis below is based on comparative static modelling conducted 
with the IMACLIM-S computable general equilibrium model. The version 
used is an open-economy one distinguishing 4 productions: 3 energy goods 
and a composite remainder; it is enhanced from previous versions by the dis-
aggregation of 20 income classes, endowed with the same adaptation capabili-
ties as those used in partial equilibrium, and by a detailed description of the 
distribution of the national income among the 20 classes, firms, public admini-
strations and the rest of the world. The resulting financial positions are bal-
anced by agent-specific interest rates on a financial market, and debt services 
duly represented.18 
Our purpose being to demonstrate the importance of the tax-recycling 
option, we choose to base our simulations on a given set of macro-economic 
behavioural assumptions: identical decreasing relation between propensity to 
consume and income; fixed investment-disposable income ratio; identical 
technical asymptotes and basic needs; fixed international prices; etc. Two sets 
of assumptions are crucial enough to deserve more exposition. 
A first set regards public administrations. On the one hand, we assume a 
strict ‘euro for a euro’ budget neutrality of the carbon tax: whatever its use the 
amount recycled is strictly identical to the amount levied, to the euro.19 On the 
other hand real we consider constant public expenses (public consumption, 
public investment, per capita transfers) and a fixed ratio of public debt to GDP 
as well. Eliminating the latter two adjustment variables facilitates the compari-
son of different options. It also triggers either a vicious or a virtuous circle, as 
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 Ghersi (2009) presents a ‘core’ version of the model limited to one global region and 2 pro-
ductions. Ghersi et al. (2009) propose a detailed description of the 2.3 version, only marginally 
different from version 2.1 applied to this research. Ghersi and Hourcade (2006) develop the 
particular stance regarding the producers’ behaviour. 
19
 In the quite detailed framework of IMACLIM-S there are many possible interpretations of the 
budget neutrality hypothesis (constant fiscal pressure, constant absolute deficit, constant ratio of 
deficit to GDP, etc.), all of which have specific macro-economic impacts. We opt for a definition 
that is arguably the most tangible, and also echoes the ‘mass conservation principle’ explored in 
partial equilibrium (cf. supra). 
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it implies the need to raise or lower other taxes20, depending on whether the 
variations of the fiscal bases compensate the direct losses of the interior tax on 
petroleum products (hereafter TIPP according to the French acronym) caused 
by the drop in automotive fuel consumption.21 
A second set of assumptions relates to the labour market and its degree 
of imperfection. First, to represent structural situations of unemployment and 
limited wage flexibility, we adopt a wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2005) that correlates the average wage relative to foreign prices to the unem-
ployment rate. The choice of correlating the wage relative to foreign prices 
rather than the real wage (i.e. the wage relative to some domestic consumer 
price index) is made to reflect competitiveness constraints specific to the 
French-European Union context. It forces a wage moderation that sets limits 
on the energy price propagation effects and amplifies a trade-off in favour of 
labour, but simultaneously allows for higher real wage losses. Second, aggre-
gate employment impacts are assumed to affect classes proportionally to their 
initial number of unemployed—which makes classes all the more sensitive to 
employment variations as they are poor. This simplifying assumption is 
adopted for lack of information and should be revised in future research. 
The resulting modelling framework is calibrated on 2004 France and 
applied to simulate 5 reforms (Table 1): 
• The R1 reform consists in taxing carbon emissions from the households, 
then refunding them the entire tax product as a fixed amount per CU—a 
reform identical to the one assessed with the introduction of a ‘mass 
conservation’ principle above. 
• The R2 reform enlarges the carbon tax base of R1 to carbon emissions 
from the firms. 
• The R3 reform covers emissions as R2 but recycles the tax proceeds in a 
decrease of payroll taxes. 
• R3ND and R4 reforms, are two variants that impose a neutralisation of 
the distributive impacts. 
                                                          
20
 The required shift is modelled as an identical scalar applied to all tax rates and excise taxes 
represented (including the payroll taxes in the case when they benefit from the euro for a euro 
recycling). 
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Reform Carbon tax on Revenue  
recycled  
Distributive impacts  
neutralised 
R1 Household  
emissions 
To households,  
fixed per CU amount 
No 
R2 All emissions To households,  
fixed per CU amount 
No 
R3 All emissions In a decrease  
of payroll taxes 
No 
R3ND All emissions In a decrease  
of payroll taxes 
Through a zero-sum 
transfer among income 
classes 
R4 All emissions To households, their ag-
gregate tax payment;  
In a decrease of payroll 
taxes, the remainder. 
Through an adjustment 
of the amount re-
funded to each class 
Table 1 Five alternative reforms for a carbon tax 
III.1. Recycling modes and activity levels: towards 
an equity-efficiency dilemma? 
By nature, shifting to a general equilibrium framework multiplies the 
criteria for comparing different policies. Focussing on the reforms R1 to R3 to 
begin with, we will start by delineating their aggregate economic impact, and 
then examine how this aggregate impact is distributed among household 
classes. 
R1 has a decreasing effect on GDP (Table 2), fundamentally consistent 
with the theoretical analysis stressing that taxing one good is less efficient 
than putting the same burden on total income—because of the Slutsky substi-
tution effect. In our simulation this effect is not compensated by the mild 
growth stemming from a redistribution in favour of the poorer classes and 
their higher propensity to consume, notably because our budget neutrality con-
straint implies increases of the pre-existing taxes. The net effect on employ-
ment is nonetheless mildly positive (+0,15% for a tax level of €200/tCO2), 
thanks to a shift in demand towards labour-intensive rather than energy-
intensive goods. 
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 The VAT on automotive fuel does not constitute such losses as the VAT is similarly levied on 
any consumption that is substituted to them (even if in some instances at a reduced rate). 
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Carbon Tax, € per tCO2 40 80 120 160 200 
Real  R1 -0,1% -0,1% -0,2% -0,2% -0,3% 
GDP R2 -0,2% -0,4% -0,6% -0,7% -0,9% 
 R3 +0,5% +0,8% +1,1% +1,3% +1,5% 
 R3ND +0,5% +0,9% +1,2% +1,4% +1,6% 
 R4 +0,2% +0,4% +0,5% +0,6% +0,7% 
Real  R1 -0,0% -0,1% -0,1% -0,2% -0,2% 
Household R2 +0,2% +0,3% +0,4% +0,4% +0,4% 
Consumption R3 +0,6% +0,9% +1,2% +1,5% +1,7% 
 R3ND +0,6% +1,1% +1,4% +1,7% +1,9% 
 R4 +0,4% +0,7% +1,0% +1,1% +1,3% 
Employment R1 +0,04% +0,08% +0,11% +0,12% +0,15% 
 R2 +0,02% -0,01% -0,06% -0,11% -0,16% 
 R3 +0,78% +1,40% +1,93% +2,38% +2,79% 
 R3ND +0,81% +1,44% +1,98% +2,45% +2,87% 
 R4 +0,50% +0,88% +1,21% +1,49% +1,73% 
Total   R1 -4,2% -8,0% -11,5% -14,9% -18,1% 
CO2 R2 -8,7% -15,0% -20,2% -24,6% -28,5% 
Emissions R3 -8,2% -14,2% -19,1% -23,3% -27,1% 
 R3ND -8,1% -14,1% -19,0% -23,2% -27,0% 
 R4 -8,4% -14,5% -19,5% -23,7% -27,6% 
N.B.: The variations prevail at the end of a post-reform adjustment process. If 20 years are required for energy mutations and 
macro-economic adjustments, then the 2.4% GDP gap between R2 and R3 is equivalent to a 0.12% variation of the average 
annual growth rate over the period. 
Table 2 General equilibrium aggregate impacts 
R2, by extending the tax base to emissions from firms, increases the 
GDP losses. This is again consistent with theoretical results (Bovenberg and 
Goulder 1996): the tax on intermediate inputs propagates to other goods and 
services, which leads to a reinforcement of the deadweight loss caused by the 
Slutsky substitution effect. In addition, the resulting general price increase 
hurts competitiveness, which contracts economic activity, which in turn forces 
public administrations to increase other tax rates—and starts a vicious circle. 
In the light of such GDP losses the consumption gains of R2 might 
seem paradoxical. They are permitted by a significant redistribution of na-
tional income in favour of households due to (i) the indexation of social trans-
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fers on prices; (ii) the payment to households of all carbon tax proceeds in-
cluding those whose burden is ultimately borne by other agents.  
The comparative results of R3 are themselves in line with the literature 
on second best economies:22 using the carbon tax proceeds to lower payroll 
taxes increases the activity level. At €200/tCO2 GDP increases by 1.5%, em-
ployment by 2.8%, and carbon emissions drop by 27%. On the latter environ-
mental achievement it is interesting to note the hardly perceivable influence of 
the recycling mode; this indicates dominance of the direct impact of the tax on 
relative prices over any indirect effect, including the variations in activity.23 
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Figure 4 General equilibrium distributive impact, reform R1 
Let us now analyse how these impacts affect the different classes. Un-
surprisingly R1, which strictly reproduces the ‘constant mass’ partial equilib-
rium variant (cf. section II.3), shows a comparable distributive impact (com-
pare Figures 3 and 4). However, general equilibrium mechanisms systemati-
                                                          
22
 Cf. the surveys provided by the relevant sections of the successive IPCC (1995, 2001, 2007). 
The results are also in line with previous modelling analyses by IMACLIM-S (Hourcade and 
Ghersi, 2000; Ghersi et al., 2001). 
23
 For the obvious reason of a smaller tax base, R1 induces abatement that is up to half as high. 
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cally decrease the welfare of the three richest classes, whereas they increase 
that of the poorest classes up to €120/tCO2. The reason for this difference in 
sensitivity lies in heterogeneous income structures and labour market situa-
tions. The poorest and modest classes indeed have high proportions of their 
income (resp. 51% and 46%) guaranteed in real terms in the form of price-
indexed social transfers. Besides, thanks to high unemployment rates (resp. 
42% and 22%) they benefit relatively more from a mild labour creation effect 
(+0.15% for €120/tCO2). For the lower tax levels, these two benefits compen-
sate the erosion of purchasing power caused by the increased fiscal pressure 
necessary to maintain public expenses and debt in a context of lower growth, 
which adds up to the direct energy price increase. By contrast the higher in-
come classes face an income loss strongly correlated to the GDP decrease; this 
loss cannot be compensated by gains on the labour market that are limited by 
much lower unemployment levels.24 
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Figure 5 General equilibrium distributive impact, reform R2 
                                                          
24
 This holds even though the gap between unemployment benefits and the average wage, i.e. the 
gain from employment creation, is strongly increasing with income. 
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The distributive impact of R2 (Figure 5) is profiled as that of R1, but 
much more contrasted. This directly results from the multiplication by 2.5 of 
the tax proceeds, and their highly progressive recycling rule. The poorest 
households are strongly advantaged: at €200/tCO2 their yearly tax payments 
amount to €500, but the generalised per-CU recycling rule hands them back 
€2 131; the €1 631 balance amounts to 8% of their consumption expenditures. 
The higher the income class, the smaller this balance compared to the revenue 
losses caused by macro-economic adjustments. It is still high enough to allow 
the median class to turn its R1 loss into a gain, but not so for the higher 
classes: at €200/tCO2 the highest class benefits from a €916 balance that 
amounts to a modest 1.3% of its consumption expenditures, and cannot com-
pensate a marked decline in activity income (wages and rents). 
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Figure 6 General equilibrium distributive impact, reform R3 
R3 results are quite different from those of R1 and R2: although R3 in-
creases both the aggregate income and total household consumption (Table 2), 
it widens the gap between income classes. At €200/tCO2 the real consumption 
increase of the richest class is ca. six times larger than that of the poorest 
(Figure 6). The lower income households are indeed compensated from the 
carbon tax burden through employment creation only, and lose the benefit of 
 21
the direct redistribution scheme. Besides, the social transfers that guarantee 
them against GDP losses also limit their ability to benefit from GDP gains. By 
contrast the richer classes, less sensitive to higher energy prices, capture a 
greater share of the increased growth thanks to income sources that are more 
correlated to general activity. 
In total, the comparison between R1, R2 and R3 ultimately leads to an 
equity-efficiency dilemma. R1 and R2, through the choice of a direct redistri-
bution of the carbon tax proceeds to households, overturn the distributive im-
pacts of the tax, but do so at the cost of GDP and either aggregate consump-
tion or employment losses. Conversely, R3 simultaneously improves GDP, 
employment and aggregate consumption, but does so by renouncing to a direct 
action on income distribution, and consequently leads to an inequitable distri-
bution of the fruits of the growth it triggers. 
III.2. Options for a compromise 
The relative performance of R3 arguably encourages to derive variants 
of this reform that, while conserving its aggregate efficiency, might fare better 
in terms of equity. The spectrum of possible variants is quite large, and it is 
obviously beyond the scope of this paper to try to cover it. R3ND and R4 are 
merely selected to illustrate how the ultimate consequences of a carbon tax 
hang on the political compromises expressed in its recycling rule. 
 22
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Figure 7 General equilibrium distributive impact, reform R3ND 
The R3ND variant combines R3 assumptions with a zero-sum transfer 
among household classes that aims at equalising their real consumption varia-
tions (Figure 7) 25. Its aggregate impacts are very close to those of R3 in both 
environmental and macro-economic terms (Table 2).26 Such a quasi separabil-
ity of efficiency and equity indicates that the behaviour of income classes is 
not heterogeneous enough to substantially modify the carbon tax impact on the 
productive system, aggregate consumption and emissions. However, any opti-
mistic inference on a possible conciliation of both criteria must be qualified by 
a caveat concerning political acceptability: R3ND submits the richer classes to 
a double levy (levy to compensate the poorer households on top of the carbon 
tax) that could only be justified under a general political compromise to de-
crease inequalities. 
                                                          
25
 This indicator, obviously not the most appropriate equity criterion, is merely retained for its 
legibility in the format used to present distributive results. Any more appropriate criterion could 
be targeted to shape the distributive compensations of R3ND and R4 without substantially chang-
ing aggregate results—as hinted by the very similar macroeconomic outcomes of R3 and R3ND. 
26
 The mild macro-economic advantage of R3ND over R3 is caused by the higher propensity to 
consume of lower income classes, who benefit from the transfers at the expense of the richer 
classes.  
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Figure 8 General equilibrium distributive impact, reform R4 
The R4 variant, at last, anticipates any argument about the burden shar-
ing between households and firms by opting for a scheme that redistributes 
their own tax payments to the former, and uses the tax payments of the latter 
to decrease payroll taxes.27 The share of the proceeds redistributed to house-
holds then allows to control the distributive effect in a manner similar to that 
of R3ND (Figure 8). The macroeconomic and distributive impacts of R4 turn 
out to fall between those of R2 on one side, and R3 on the other side. By con-
trast to R2 GDP increases, as production costs benefit from the recycling of 
the tax proceeds levied on intermediate consumption; this generates consump-
tion gains that, by contrast to R3, are distributed in a controlled manner. 
                                                          
27
 This dual recycling has been prevailing in Switzerland since January 2008: tax proceeds levied 
on intermediate consumption are redistributed to firms on the basis of their labour costs; those 
levied on final consumption are redistributed to households through a rebate on their public 
health insurance cost. 
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Conclusion 
The contrasted impacts of a carbon tax on different household classes 
ultimately result from the interaction of three effects: (i) the sheer weight of 
the tax payments, strongly determined by the budget share of energy expenses 
and hence rather regressive; (ii) the distribution of the macroeconomic conse-
quences of the tax (themselves strongly sensitive to the recycling of its pro-
ceeds), which hangs both on the specific position of each class on the labour 
market (rate of unemployment, wedge between wage and unemployment bene-
fits) and on its income structure (share of revenue only remotely connected to 
variations in general activity—transfer payments); (iii) potential direct redis-
tribution schemes of part or of all the tax proceeds to households, which offer 
a powerful leverage to overturn the first two effects. 
Contrary to a misconception inherited from partial equilibrium analyses, 
there is thus no mechanical link between a carbon tax and its ultimate distribu-
tive effects. The implementation of a carbon tax invites indeed to a political 
trade-off through the choice of a recycling rule. A direct redistribution of the 
tax proceeds to households can be used to favour the poorest household 
classes, but at a macroeconomic cost in terms of both GDP and either aggre-
gate consumption or employment. Conversely, a recycling of all tax proceeds 
in lower payroll taxes results in higher GDP, consumption and employment, 
but at the cost of a widening of the gap between the lower and the higher reve-
nue classes—although it manages to increase the consumption of all classes. A 
mix recycling scheme, which devotes the tax levied on firms to payroll tax 
rebates, and that levied on household to the financing of redistributive trans-
fers, is proven to provide a compromise between the two polar options: it al-
lows to achieve both an improvement of all macroeconomic indicators, and a 
control of the distributive impacts of the reform. 
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